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Reasonable Certainty
Reliability and validity of clinical judgment. The expert witness may attempt to determine the current, prior, or future state of the person under examination. Can the person comprehend the charges against him? Could an individual appreciate the consequences of his actions at the time of the crime? Will an injury preclude future employment? These questions vary in difficulty. We will first review clinicians' successes in answering the simpler and more practiced questions common to everyday clinical work-those that form the basis for addressing the more complex and less familiar questions common to the courtroom.
There is perhaps nothing more fundamental or basic to the science of psychiatry than the classification or diagnosis of patients, and no more fundamental a hurdle than reliability, or cross-clinician consistency in the diagnoses rendered. If clinicians assign widely varying diagnoses, classification will be as much a product of extraneous factors or the diagnostician's idiosyncrasies as it is the examinee's actual status.
Psychiatry has been continuously plagued by difficulties in achieving reliable classification. The American Psychiatric Association has revised the official diagnostic manual at a quickening pace: The first Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-I) was published in 1952, DSM-II in 1968, DSM-III in 1980, and DSM-III-Revised in 1987. The next revision, DSM-IV, is slated for publication in the early 1990s. This process of revision little resembles the refinement of categories or cumulative gains common to advanced scientific fields. DSM-I and II often produced poor inter-rater agreement (5), and the diagnostic system was radically altered with the publication of DSM-III. DSM-III introduced more specific classification procedures, changed hundreds of diagnostic criteria, and added or eliminated numerous categories of disorder. DSM-III-R introduced about 200 additional changes in diagnostic guidelines and criteria.
The initial DSM-III field trials appeared to demonstrate improved diagnostic reliability, but serious methodological shortcomings raised doubts about the results (6). A number of subsequent studies showed that rate of disagreement for specific diagnostic categories often equals or exceeds rate of agreement (7-9). The reliability of DSM-III-R awaits testing because many of the changes were Studies that compare clinicians' predictions against objectively determinable, hard data commonly show that error rate exceeds accuracy rate (3). In one study, for example, a series of military recruits was retained in service despite psychiatrists' recommendations that they be discharged for severe psychiatric liabilities (11). After 2 years, most of these individuals had remained on active duty and their overall rate of success and adjustment was not substantially different from that of matched controls initially judged to be free of pathology.
Reliability and validity offorensicjudgments. The research on reliability and validity cited above mainly examines clinical questions, not forensic questions, and the two can differ substantially. A clinical diagnosis, for example, may relate minimally to the issues of forensic interest. The clinical criteria for "insanity" or psychosis do not include such tests of legal insanity as the capacity to appreciate the consequences of one's action or to resist an impulse. A determination that the clinical criteria have been met does not establish satisfaction of the legal criteria. The considerable heterogeneity among individuals who fall within the same diagnostic category further limits forensic value. When a jury considers a criminal defense of diminished mental capacity, a diagnosis such as "posttraumatic stress disorder" offers little guidance. According to the diagnostic manual, individuals with this disorder can show either substantial or minimal impairment in judgment. Additionally, most available research addresses clinical distinctions, and there may be little or no research that pertains to forensic distinctions.
Clinicians who enter the forensic arena also shift from their more familiar role as the patient's helping agent and instead seek to uncover truth, whatever its implications for the person under examination (3, 12). The clinician thus becomes a potential adversary. The forensic role is often less familiar or practiced, the clinician's engrained tendency to support or empathize may cloud objectivity, and the person being examined may be less inclined to disclose information openly and honestly. Clinicians, who usually focus primarily on the patient's subjective reality, must now attempt to determine objective reality, a task for which they may be minimally trained.
The expert witness thus becomes engaged in less familiar questions and activities, often with minimal research backing. Not surprisingly, studies examining the accuracy of judgments directly pertinent to forensic assessment, such as the ability to detect the simulation of disorder (that is, malingering) or to predict violence, have shown particularly high rates of error among clinicians.
A determination of a subject's credibility is often essential in forensic assessment. The potential benefits of a favorable courtroom decision, such as relief from serious criminal charges or large financial gains, can lead individuals to feign disorder. Studies show, however, that clinicians often cannot distinguish the psychological test results of normal subjects asked to feign psychosis (or to simulate brain damage) and actual diagnosed cases (13-15). For example, clinicians disregard or underuse information about the frequency of occurrence, or base rates (31). Many diagnostic signs within psychology show associations of modest strength, at best, with the condition or event of interest. For example, a test indicator of suicidal intent may occur in 80% of true cases but also in 10% of negative cases. As such, the value of this and other diagnostic indicators is never constant but relative to the frequency of events. If suicidal intent is present in one per 1000 patients, this one patient will likely be identified correctly. However, 10% of the remaining 999 patients, or about 99, will be misidentified as suicidal, resulting in almost 100 times more errors than correct identifications. If the frequencies shift, the sign's value shifts also. Given typical limitations in the strength of signs and the low frequency of most psychiatric disorders, numerous diagnostic signs produce more errors than correct identifications. Many faulty signs remain popular because disregard of base rates and associated principles of probability preclude an accurate determination of their worth.
Clinicians also overvalue supportive evidence and undervalue counterevidence (32). In psychology, the selective pursuit of supportive evidence is especially pernicious. Individual behavior is highly variable across time and situation, and tremendous overlap exists across criteria for various psychiatric disturbances and between the characteristics of aberrant and normal individuals. The lives of normal individuals commonly contain the full range of trauma, stress, and turmoil found among the disordered (33). Clinicians typically expect to find abnormality, and a search for supportive evidence will almost always "succeed" regardless of the examinee's mental health. In one study that enhanced the expectancy to find abnormality, every psychiatrist who heard a script portraying a well-adjusted individual nevertheless diagnosed mental disorder (34). This tendency to assume the presence of abnormality and then seek supportive evidence fosters "overpathologizing," that is, the frequent misidentification of individuals as abnormal.
Selective attention to supportive evidence also fosters "illusory correlations," or the belief in relations that appear to be, but are not, valid (23) . Suppose that a diagnostic "sign" and a disorder are actually unrelated but sometimes co-occur by chance alone. The clinician who neglects instances in which the sign or disorder appears independently and rather focuses on co-occurrences, comes to believe that the two are related. For example, some clinicians believe that individuals who produce human figure drawings with accentuated eyes have "paranoid" traits. The repeated "discovery" of "confirming" instances, embedded in the context of salient personal experience, creates a compelling illusion that overpowers any awareness of contrary instances or scientific research. Clinicians continue to use human figure drawings despite scientific evidence that disconfirms the perceived association between accentuated eyes and paranoia, and other assumed relations between drawing characteristics and personality traits.
Studies on experience and accuracy show that the conditions under which clinicians practice do not promote experiential learning, a finding that confirmatory bias and illusory correlation help to explain. Clinicians often receive little or no outcome information or feedback about their judgments, which precludes self-correction. The feedback clinicians do receive is often garbled and prone to the same problematic judgment practices that hinder original case appraisals.
Most clinical feedback occurs in the context of therapy. This feedback is skewed and confounded with outcome. To illustrateclientele particularly pleased with services may be most likely to make follow-up contacts with the therapist, in which they further express praise and thanks. The therapist obtains a select, rather than a representative sample of the varying pieces that comprise outcome as a whole. Further, therapists' initial appraisals produce actions that can lead to self-fulfilling prophesies. The therapist who decides he would not work well with a patient and transfers the case will never find his judgment disconfirmed. Additionally, clients may purposely or inadvertently provide misleading feedback. Clinicians often evaluate their own judgmental accuracy by observing patients' agreement with their interpretations or descriptions. However, research shows that individuals believe in overly general personality descriptors of dubious validity, a form of suggestibility that provides a livelihood for astrologers and palm readers and misguides clinicians (35) .
Selective attention to supportive evidence similarly affects clinicians' appraisals of their own judgmental accuracy (36) . A clinician will inevitably receive some outcome information that appears to support his conclusions. The clinician who tells patients that they appear depressed will often obtain affirmation regardless of accuracy, either because patients mistakenly accept the clinician's opinion or are hesitant to disagree with a person upon whom they depend. The number of instances that appear to provide confirmation exceeds its actual frequency, a problem compounded by the underweighting of conflicting evidence. Given the ambiguity of feedback and the clinician's reliance on theories that allow contradictory interpretations of identical outcomes, counterevidence is easily incorporated into prior beliefs. The patient who challenges a conclusion is viewed as "resisting" the truth or "repressing" it from conscious awareness. The result of these clinical practices and mental habits is overconfidence in judgmental abilities (37). In a study on the detection of malingering, most clinicians expressed extreme confidence on a diagnostic task in which error rate ranged from 90 to 100% (15).
Self-appraisal of clinical judgment. Overconfidence is one facet of a more general problem appraising one's own judgmental success and decision processes. Research methods that compare subjective impressions to objective measures of data utilization have revealed substantial discrepancies (30). Clinicians may believe that certain variables that actually exerted minimal influence on their conclusions played a key role, and vice versa (38) . For example, a clinician's conclusion may be largely determined by potentially biasing information (for example, a prior opinion) which is sincerely thought to have had no influence.
Clinicians commonly propose that their conclusions rest on a careful weighting of many variables, whereas objective analysis typically shows that only a few variables, perhaps two or three, exert a significant impact (39-40). Clinicians also assert that complex configural analysis or data integration is necessary to reach accurate conclusions-that one never considers datum in isolation but rather the "whole" or overall pattern of results. However, numerous studies suggest that no clinician, or human being for that matter, can begin to manage such complex cognitive operations ( 
Conclusions and Implications
We began by asking whether expert witnesses achieve reasonable certainty and aid the trier of fact. The scientific evidence clearly suggests that clinicians fail to satisfy either legal standard for expertise. Clinicians frequently cannot agree on psychiatric diagnoses of current states, much less provide trustworthy answers to less familiar and more difficult forensic questions, which often demand projections backward or forward in time. Considerable research also shows that clinicians' judgmental accuracy does not surpass that of laypersons. However, actuarial methods may satisfy one of the standards. Although actuarial procedures rarely address questions of direct forensic interest and usually achieve modest results, rather than reasonable certainty, their accuracy does surpass both professionals and laypersons. It is for the courts to decide whether clinicians' failure to meet both standards should exclude them as expert witnesses, and whether satisfaction of the second standard alone is sufficient to admit actuarial conclusions as courtroom evidence.
Should the courts admit actuarial outcomes, research suggests a limited role for experts. A knowledgeable expert can inform the court whether an actuarial procedure is applicable to the particular examinee and question of interest. For example, MMPI indices for malingering may sometimes aid the court, but the MMPI should not be used with individuals of limited intellectual endowment. The expert may also help as needed to explain output statements, which may contain psychological jargon, and can review relevant research on the accuracy of the particular actuarial technique. However, according to available research, the expert's involvement should end in the explanation of the actuarial procedure. The expert's involvement in the interpretation of the clinical data, or attempts to "refine" or modify actuarial conclusions, produce inferior overall results.
Experts who are aware of the negative scientific evidence may assert that the research does not apply to them. Many of the psychologists and psychiatrists who participated in judgment studies probably held the same prior belief, although the research showed otherwise. Clinicians who claim exemption almost always lack objective data on their judgmental accuracy. Given the many studies that raise serious doubt about clinical judgment and the obstacles to valid self-appraisal of judgmental success, the clinician who makes a counterclaim should bear the burden of proof. The validity of counterclaims could be appraised directly. Certifying bodies could conduct objective evaluation of the clinician's performance on a representative sample of cases that can be verified against objective data. There are no definitive means for verifying certain types of clinical judgments, including most diagnoses, but research methods permit objective evaluation of performance on many judgment tasks. For example, clinicians can be asked to predict occupational success and their judgments compared to known outcomes in actual cases.
What of the possible conclusion that the involvement of expert witnesses is not helpful but does no harm? As discussed, expert testimony may exert a prejudicial affect on juries. Confidence and accuracy can be inversely related, and yet the jury may well accept the opinion of an expert who exudes confidence over that of an opposing expert who expresses appropriate caution. Expert evidence is readily subject to abuse due to its highly subjective nature and vulnerability to biases. The involvement of experts wastes many hours of already too scarce court time and costs taxpayers millions of dollars. Experts also create malpractice risks for colleagues. Each time an expert witness claims he can predict violent behavior with reasonable certainty, he endorses a falsehood. A competent clinician who could not have anticipated his patient's violent episode may thus be held legally accountable.
As the courts and the public come to realize the immense gap between experts' claims about their judgmental powers and the scientific findings, the credibility of psychology and psychiatry will suffer accordingly. Psychological research should eventually yield more certain knowledge and methods that provide meaningful assistance to the trier of fact. Ironically, unlike the current situation in which expert testimony is often admitted despite the negative research on its value, the erosion of credibility may reverse this trend. The courts, having learned to distrust clinicians' claims, may refuse to admit testimony based on truly useful knowledge and methods despite more than adequate supportive studies.
